Challenge of Japan Before World War II by Nazli Choucri

Author:Nazli Choucri [Choucri, Nazli]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Ethnic Studies, Social Science, Political Science, Regional Studies, General
ISBN: 9781136130205
Google: lXyAAAAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 18976919
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 1992-12-12T00:00:00+00:00

DECISION CONFIRMED

The agenda for the Imperial Conference that would sanction war was agreed upon at the seventy-fourth Liaison Conference on 29 November. The question of what to do about the United States during the interval prior to the firing of the first shot remained unsettled, however. Discussions had to be continued as long as possible. Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo asked if there were enough time left to carry on diplomacy. ‘We do have enough time,’ navy chief of staff Nagano replied. Togo wanted to know when the fighting would start. ‘Tell me what the zero hour is,’ Togo demanded. ‘Otherwise I can’t carry on diplomacy.’ Nagano complied. ‘Well, then, I will tell you. The zero hour is –’ he lowered his voice, ‘December 8 [Tokyo time]’ (Ike 1967: 260–2).

Arrangements were made for the emperor to consult with senior statesmen – specifically, the ex-premiers – who gathered at the palace on the morning of the 29th. Since Tojo refused to answer questions dealing with operational matters, ‘the senior statesmen learned nothing at all about the projected naval strike against Pearl Harbor or about any other phase of Japan’s war plans,’ but the Prime Minister did explain why war with the United States and Great Britain ‘could not be avoided.’ After lunch the emperor, who had not been present during the morning session, ‘spent an hour in the imperial study listening to the views of the ex-premiers.’ First to speak, Baron Wakatsuki ‘testified to his faith in the “spiritual strength” of the Japanese people but expressed concern over Japan’s ability to fight a protracted war from the point of view of material.’ Admiral Yonai urged that great care should be taken against ‘going for broke in a single throw,’ and Mr Hirota, ‘the only former premier with practical diplomatic experience,’ thought that ‘the true intentions of parties engaged in diplomatic negotiations … only became clear after two or three crises had occurred.’ He wondered, therefore, what purpose could be served ‘by going to war immediately’ (Butow 1961: 345–7).

When the Imperial Conference of 1 December convened, the Japanese task force ‘whose mission was to attack Pearl Harbor had set sail, under sealed orders, from Hitokappu Bay in the remote Kuriles…. The issue of war or peace had been debated at length, and now it was time to formalize the decision.’ In an opening statement, Prime Minister Tojo emphasized that the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and China had ‘increased their economic and military pressure against’ Japan, and that the leadership had now reached a point where the situation could no longer be allowed to continue. ‘Under the circumstances,’ he asserted, ‘our Empire has no alternative but to begin war against the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands in order to resolve the present crisis and assure survival.’ Foreign Minister Togo summarized his interpretation of Japanese–American negotiations, and questions were raised and comments offered by other participants in the conference. In response to doubts raised by president of the Privy Council Hara

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